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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
people rather than having a large economic loss sustained by one
person.
14
W/ollerman espouses a minority view and extends the normal
application of res ipsa loquitur by enlarging the standard of care
owed to a business invitee. However, the decision did not advocate
that the self-service store owner become an insurer. Instead, a plain-
tiff should be granted recourse to res ipsa loquitur only when a high
standard of care is owed him, when the cause of his injury is fore-
seeable by the defendant, and when the defendant's superior knowl-
edge enables him to best explain how the injury occurred. What
this promotes is care commensurate with the risks involved.
DONALD A. INSUL
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - UNAUTHORIZED OR
UNNECESSARY OPERATION - INFORMED CONSENT
Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
The plaintiff consulted an orthopedic surgeon for treatment of
his atrophied left leg and two weeks later was admitted to the hos-
pital where he signed a "Consent to Operation."' Subsequently,
the plaintiff was referred to the defendant neurosurgeon, who com-
petently performed an exploratory laminectomy, u as a result of
which the plaintiff became paralyzed from the waist down. The
plaintiff brought suit against the surgeon, asserting injuries and
damages caused by negligent surgery and diagnosis, abandonment,3
and failure to secure the necessary consent.4
The trial court ruled that the case could not go to the jury on
the issue of negligence, and when the plaintiff withdrew his charge
of abandonment, the case was submitted to the jury solely on the
issue of consent. A verdict was returned for plaintiff, but the court
sitting en banc reversed by granting judgment notwithstanding the
14 Application of the "'deep-pocket" theory can be found in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314. Under this section the drafters of the code have decided to hold the
seller responsible for the goods he sells. He can be liable for defects of which he may
not have been aware and even for which he may not have been responsible. By analogy,
it is seen that the owner of the self-service store may not be the person responsible for
the injury sustained by the plaintiff, yet he will be constrained to show what steps have
been taken to prevent injuries from occurring on the premises. Under both the UCC
and res ipsa loquitur there is an intent to protect customers, for in most circumstances
they are less able to absorb the expense of an injury and have less opportunity to insure
against it.
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verdict. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
issue of consent was properly submitted to the jury and reinstated
the jury's verdict.5 It was decided that the defendant could not have
assumed the consent form was intended for him because it was
signed before he was referred to the plaintiff. Even apart from this
deficiency, the consent would not have barred the action because
it "'was not given with a true understanding of the nature of the
operation to be performed."'" A vigorous dissent attacked the ma-
jority's decision for ignoring the parol evidence rule and predicted
that increased medical malpractice litigation would result7
Generally, a physician's liability in a medical malpractice action
is predicated on negligence! However, even where the physician
is personally free from negligence in the actual treatment of or op-
I A "Consent to Operation" is a generalized form used by most hospitals. It is
an agreement in which the patient acknowledges that he is to be operated on and
authorizes the physicians of the hospital to perform whatever operative procedures they
deem necessary. See Hirsch, Consent to Medical Treatment - with Forms, 5 TRIAL
LAW. GUIDE 51 (1961).
2 This is a surgical operation in which the posterior arch of the vertebra is re-
moved. The vertebrae are "bone blocks" of which the spine is comprised. SCHMIDT,
ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 431 (1965).
a Abandonment is an actionable type of malpractice occurring when a physician
unreasonably terminates the physician-patient relationship and injury directly results.
For a general discussion of the subject, see 36 TuL. L REv. 834 (1962).
4 "Consent" is abstractly defined as a concurrence of wills or a voluntary yielding
of the will to the proposition of another. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
When a patient consents to an operation, he authorizes the physician to operate on his
body. See Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L REv. 189 (1961).
It is well settled that in the absence of an emergency, a physician must first obtain
the consent of a patient before treating or operating on him. E.g., Mohr v. Williams,
95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1904); Schloendorff v. Society Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,
105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3 (1957); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913); Hively v.
Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363 (1927). The reasoning behind the rule was suc-
cinctly stated in Schloendorff by Judge Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to decide what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patients consent commits an assault
for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society Hosp., supra at 126, 105 N.E.-
2d at 93. The rule recognizes that the consent may be implied under some circum-
stances, Mohr v. Williams, supra (recognizing but refusing to apply), and that the exis-
tence of an emergency may justify operating without any consent if immediate action
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the patient. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 225
Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922).
5 Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
6 Id. at 674. The court adopts the view expressed in Powell, supra note 4, at 193.
7 223 A.2d at 677. Parol evidence of prior oral or written negotiations or agree-
ments of the parties to a written contract, which varies or contradicts the written con-
tract, is generally inadmissible. For a thorough discussion of the rule and its ramifica-
tions, see 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 573-96 (1960); SIMPsON, CONTRACTS §§ 98-
101 (2d ed. 1965).
8 70 CJ.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 57 (1951).
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eration on the patient, he may be liable if he cared for the patient
without the latter's consent.' Consent is the patient's authorization
to have his body touched by the physician,"0 and an operation with-
out the consent of the patient or someone authorized to give it"
constitutes a battery."
A group of recent cases,'3 including the Gray decision, has
somewhat modified the general rules concerning consent. It is re-
quired not only that a patient consent to an operation but also that
the consent be "understandingly" given.'4 That is, prior to an
operation, a doctor has a duty to inform his patient of the na-
ture of his illness, the nature of the operation and possible risks in-
volved, and the feasible alternative treatments so that the patient
may intelligently decide whether or not he wishes the operation.
9 See representative cases cited note 4 sapra.
10 The nature of the patient's consent is discussed in note 4 supra.
11 It has been said that a husband has no inherent power to consent to a dangerous
operation for his mentally competent wife. Pratt v. Davis, 224 IML 300, 79 N.. 562(1906). However, when the wife has less than full possession of her faculties, the
situation changes. Ibid,
Sound medical practice requires a doctor to obtain the parent's consent before op-
erating on a minor child, but it has been held that a doctor may proceed with only
the minor's consent Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906).
12E.g., Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955); Wall v. Brim, 138
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P.2d 142 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1939); Pratt v. Davis, supra: note 11; Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 Ri.. 165, 64
A.2d 866 (1949). The classification of the plaintiff's claim as one for battery rather
than for negligence has many possible effects. In a battery action, there is no need
to show any physical injury, damages being established by the unwarranted touching
of plaintiff's body. See PROssER, TORTS 33-34 (3d ed. 1965); RES=ATENT (SEc-
OND), TORTS § 18, comment c (1965). Also, punitive or exemplary damages are more
likely to be awarded in a battery action than in an action based on negligence, be-
cause a battery is intentional. See PRossER, op. cit. supra. at 9-10. Most significant,
especially to plaintiffs, is that in a battery action the plaintiff may rely entirely on non-
expert testimony in contrast to the requirement in negligent malpractice cases that
medical experts be used to establish the basic standard of conduct or deviation there-
from. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Hull v. Plumer,
131 N.J.L 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944). On the other hand, the plaintiff whose case is
characterized as one in battery may find that he is unable to bring an action against
the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964).
See, e.g., Moos v. United States, supra. It has been suggested that if the battery claim
is based upon an unauthorized operation, it is so inconsistent with a negligence claim
that the two may not be maintained in the same action. Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo.
252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
13 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 560, 317
P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Di Filipo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333(1964); Russell v. Harwick, 166 So. 2d 904 (Fla. App. 1964), cert. discharged, 182
So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1966); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963); Natan-
son v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp.,
251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1960); DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965); Scott v.
Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
14 "Understandingly" is defined in the cases cited note 13 supra.
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The consent required in these cases has been termed informed
consent.1 5
Exactly what a physician must tell his patient prior to an opera-
tion to satisfy the duty of adequately "informing' is not well de-
fined. A reading of the cases reveals various standards by which
the courts determine whether a doctor has fulfilled his obligation
to inform by: a reasonable disclosure;'" a disclosure of any facts
necessary to an intelligent consent;'" or a disclosure to the extent
that the profession recognizes a duty.'" Despite the variety of stan-
dards, the means of determining whether a particular one has been
met is common to all, namely, an examination of what the physician
told his patient prior to the operation.
The court in the instant case, however, determined the critical
issue to be not what the doctor actually told the patient prior to the
operation but rather what the latter understood of what was ex-
plained to him. The opinion stated: [Ilt will be no defense for a
surgeon to prove that the patient had given his consent, if the con-
sent was not given with a true understanding of the nature of the
operation to be performed.' "'s
To require the patient to have a "true understanding of the na-
ture of the operation"2 ° involves, at a minimum, the physician's ap-
prising the patient of his pre-operative condition, the basic opera-
tive procedures, and any adverse consequences that might arise from
the operation. In effect, this requirement subjects a physician to the
possibility of a lawsuit if, in the exercise of his professional judg-
ment, he withholds from the patient any information concerning
the operation and its possible ramifications.
The desirability of judicially limiting the doctor's discretion in
determining what facts to disclose prior to an operation is question-
able. As indicated by its position, the court in the Gray case val-
ues such a limitation, although its reasons for imposing such a limi-
tation are not clear because the policy grounds, if any, on which the
decision rests are not enumerated. It is dear, however, that the
15 Morris, Malpractice: Medical - The Important Events of the Last Two Years,
30 INS. COUNSEL J. 44, 50 (1963); Oppenaheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treat-
ment, 11 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 249, 253 (1962).
16 DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510,261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965).
'7 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (Dist. Cr. App. 1957).
18 Di Filipo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1964); Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
10 Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966).
20 Ibid.
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court was compelled to choose between conflicting interests. Pres-
ent in the case at bar were, on the one hand, the doctor's interest in
the unrestricted exercise of his discretion2" and, on the other, the pa-
tient's right to have his body secure from unwarranted touching.22
It is doubtful that the court in the instant case based its decision
solely on the grounds that a patient has a right to be secure from
unwarranted touching,-2 because it cannot be said with any candor
that patients, as a group, are in any real peril of suffering battery.24
The traditional battery involves a defendant who is acting for
the most part out of malice or in a manner considered hostile,2"
whereas the usual26 medical malpractice suit is brought against a
doctor for an operation which was performed with the best inter-
ests of the patient in mind. 7
Rather than attempting to insure patient security, the court's
decision very likely represents an endeavor to stimulate physician-
patient communication preceding an operation.28 If so, this should
be accomplished without seriously limiting a doctor's discretion con-
2 1 According to one writer, the doctor's privileges should be conditional, in that
his discretion should be limited in those situations where the patient would feel end-
tled to have the information as a basis for charting his future and where there are no
grounds for supposing that a disclosure would engender reactions dangerous to the
patient's health. Smith, Therapeutic Privilege To Withhold Specific Diagnosis From
Patient Sick With Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L REV. 349 (1946).
22 Generally, the plaintiff in a battery action desires freedom from offensive bodily
contact. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 12, § 9; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS
§ 18, comment c (1965). Bodily contact is actionable if it offends a reasonable sense
of personal dignity. Id. § 19.
2 3 The physician-patient relationship has long been recognized as one of trust and
confidence. The acme of such recognition is contained in Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83
N.J.L 20, 83 Ad. 948 (1912) where, in order to find consent for the operation that
had been performed, it was said that the physician was an agent for the anesthetized
patient and could confer consent upon himself to perform the operation.2 4 See cases cited note 12 supra.
25 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 12, § 9, at 34; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS
16 (1965).2 6 Minor exceptions do exist. See, e.g., Keen v. Coleman, 67 Ga. App. 331, 20
S.E.2d 175 (1942) (physician causing a miscarriage over the protests of patient); Bar-
tell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900) (defendant, under pretense of giving
massage treatment, examined and touched a young girl's naked body); cf. Byran v.
Grace, 63 Ga. App. 373, 11 S.E.2d 241 (1940) (dentist engaging in hyper-sexual ges-
tures).2 7 E.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1904); Bennan v. Par-
sonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 Ad. 948 (1912); King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270
(1922). In each of these cases, the physician was sued for removing dangers to the
patient's health which were not anticipated at the diagnostic stage of the physician-
patient relationship.
28 Such a conclusion logically flows from an examination of the inquiry which the
court made in order to determine whether the plaintiff had consented to the opera-
tion - i.e., did the patient "have a true understanding of the nature of the operation."
Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966).
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cerning pre-operative discussions, for there are some instances where
it would not be good medical practice29 to tell the "whole truth." °
Where full disclosure would create fright and nervous tension
in an already alarmed patient, the physician should be allowed to
employ his discretion and withhold what information he thinks ad-
visable.31 Furthermore, it is questionable whether a doctor can
intelligently communicate the significance of certain facts or the
weight to be given to his conclusions. Finally, the most cogent
argument for keeping pre-operative discussions within the doctor's
discretion is the impairment to medical progress that would result
from the limitations placed thereon.32 A "fully" informed patient,
when confronted with a new technique, is liable to become unduly
frightened and refuse to submit to what will generally prove to be
an otherwise harmless and beneficial operation.33 It is apparent that
if this situation became commonplace, the progress of medicine
would be severely restricted.
The court in Gray v. Grunnagle4 could have protected the phy-
sician's discretion in pre-operative dealings and at the same time
increased physician-patient communication. The question of whether
a doctor has adequately informed his patient should not be deter-
mined by the patient's understanding" of what was told him, but
rather should be determined by an examination of the physician's
conduct in light of the particular needs of the patient. The inquiry
should be whether a physician of similar standing in the commu-
nity, having considered the patient's situation, would have justifia-
bly concluded that the patient, if "fully informed," would not have
withdrawn his consent."6 This standard not only emphasizes the
right of a patient to be "informed" concerning his operation but
29 One writer maintains that an unnecessarily detailed analysis of the patient's case
which alarms the patient may itself constitute malpractice. McCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L REV. 549, 596-97 (1959).
3 0 The possibility that harm to the patient's interest might accrue from a disclosure
of the "whole truth" was noted in Henderson, Physician and Patient as a Social System,
212 Nnw ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 819, 823 (1935). The writer exhorts the doctor to
"do no harm" rather than tell the "whole truth." Ibid.
31 See Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 251.
32Id. at 261.
3d. at 251.
34 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
35 Id. at 674.
36 For a general discussion of the standard of care to which the physician should
comply, see Oppenheim, Standard of Care of Medical General Practitioners, 9 CLEV.-
AW. L. REv. 227 (1960); Schroeder, The Standard of Medical Care (pt. 1), 35 POST
GRADUATE MEDIciNE A75 (1964).
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also preserves the doctor's discretionary processes by implicitly recog-
nizing that situations37 exist in which the doctor, employing the best
practice, may choose to withhold some "facts" from his patient. The
test calls upon the doctor to measure each case individually, draw-
ing from his wealth of knowledge and experience, and to disclose
those factors which he deems essential to an intelligent decision by
his patient.
This proposed test, unlike that employed in the instant case,
does not reward the patient who "guessed wrongly" concerning the
meaning of what the physician told him prior to the operation. By
virtue of the inquiry made by the court in the instant case, a patient
who "guessed wrongly" could still be compensated because he did
not have a "true understanding of the nature of the operation." Es-
pecially after a disappointing operation, " the patient would be ex-
tremely tempted to become "confused" as to what was told him
prior to the operation. When a large reward from a sympathetic
jury is contemplated, the temptation is even greater. In this respect
there would seem to be some substance to the fear that the decision
in the instant case "opens wide the door ... to fraud"39 and to in-
creased malpractice litigation.40
The increasing number41 of medical malpractice suits unfor-
tunately involves, as has been contended,' many unwarranted
claims. The physician can do much to reduce the number of mal-
practice suits by exercising reasonable care in following accepted
methods of practice, keeping accurate and complete records of the
patient's history, symptoms, treatment, and progress, and adopting
a friendly attitude toward patients and fellow physicians.43 The
37 For illustrative situations, see text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
38 It has been suggested that a good many cases involving unauthorized operations
are brought by patients who are disillusioned by the result of the operation. McCoid,
A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REv.
381, 426 (1957). See also Clephane, Recent Trends in Malpractice, 63 PA. MEDICAL
J. 857 (1960).
39 223 A.2d at 676 (dissenting opinion).
40 Ibid.
4 1 The court system through which the instant case rose decided only twenty-four
medical malpractice cases between 1834 and 1934, while between 1950 and 1960
alone, there were twelve cases decided. Clephane, supra note 38, at 857. Estimates
of the number of medical malpractice suits filed yearly reach 6,000, the total cost of
which is judged to be about $50,000,000. Ibid.
42 Berger, Some Thoughts on a New Method of Reducing the Number of Malprac-
tice Actions, 92 MEDICAL TIMES 1292 (1964).
4 3 Means by which the physician might reduce the number of medical malpractice
suits are noted in Clephane, supra note 38, at 864; Cockrell, Suggestions for Avoiding
Malpractice Suits, 27 AM. SURGEON 152 (1961).
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